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An Appraisal of Socially Responsible Investments and Implications for
Trustees and Other Investment Fiduciaries
by Paul U Ali and Martin Gold'
trA pension fund trustee is not the guardian of the moral welfare of the fund members,,1
A. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the suitability for trustees and other investment fiduciaries of the class
of investments known variously as "socially responsible", "ethical", "screened", "social" or
"sustainable" investments, in the context of the legal duties imposed on fiduciaries to invest
the fund entrusted to them in a prudent manner. The paper is intended to provide trustees
and investment fiduciaries with the legal tools for appraising socially responsible investments,
a task fraught with difficulties given the political sensitivities and controversies associated
with such investments.
An estimated $1.9 billion has been invested according to socially responsible investment
r'SRI") strategies by Australian managed investment schemes and superannuation funds (as at
31 December 2001). 2 The value of funds under management is likely to increase
substantially, in line with the growing perception on the part of Australian investors in
• The authors are also principals of Stellar Capital, a private capital firm. We would like to thank
Associate-Professor Geof Stapledon, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, Professor Michael S Knoll,
Law School and the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania for kindly providing us with his research
on United States SRI funds, Professor Ian Ramsay, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne for his
comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Mr Brent Miles, Royal Sun Alliance, Sydney for his
assistance with programming and the preparation of data.
1 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, '1"rustees and their Broader Community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics
Converge" (1996) 70 ALJ 205, at 211 .
2 Source: Rainmaker Roundup, Dec. 2001.
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managed investment schemes and members of superannuation funds that funds can be
invested in a socially responsible manner without sacrificing financial performance. 3
Moreover, the adoption of SRI strategies by trustees and other investment fiduciaries has
been tacitly advanced by the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth). This Act - pursuant to
amendments introduced in the Senate by the Australian Democrats in August 2001 - requires
ttproduct Disclosure Statements" issued in respect of managed investment funds and other
investment products to disclose the extent to which labour standards or environmental, social
or ethical considerations have been taken into account by the manager of the fund or product
in selecting, retaining and realising investments. 4
Organisation of this paper
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part provides a brief background to the SRI
phenomenon in Australia, explains the legal structure of SRI funds, and discusses the duties
incumbent on trustees and other investment fiduciaries when investing in an SRI fund or
adopting an SRI strategy. The second part of this paper contains an empirical assessment of
SRI strategies and considers the consequences for trustees and other investment fiduciaries.
3 A recent study undertaken by the Investment and Financial Services Association indicates that up to
45% of Australian fund managers are contemplating offering SRI funds during 2002 to meet expected
future demand from superannuation trustees and individual investors.: Key Industry Statistics Survey
(IFSA, Aug. 2001).
4 Section 10130(1 )(l), Schedule 1, Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth). The obligation to provide a
Product Disclosure Statement for a financial product arises where a "regulated person" recommends
the acquisition of a financial product or makes an offer for the issue or sale of a financial product: ss
1012A, 1012B and 1012C. Regulated persons include issuers and sellers of financial products, financial
services licensees and their authorised representatives and certain parties that are exempt from the
requirement to hold a financial services licence: s 1011 B. The Act came into force on 11 March 2002.
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B. AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS
Background
Socially responsible investing is not a new concept. It is generally accepted that SRI funds
originated with the Quaker and Methodist religious movements in the 19th Century. 5 In the
United States, the earliest SRI funds were the Pioneer Fund (founded in 1928), the Pax World
Fund (founded in 1970) and the Dreyfus Third Century Fund (founded in 1972).6 The first SRI
fund in the United Kingdom, the Friends Provident Stewardship Fund, was launched in 1984
while the first Australian SRI fund, the Tower Ethical Growth Portfolio (previously called the
Friends Provident Ethical Fund) was established in 1986.7
The growth of SRI funds in Australia is broadly attributable to two factors.
5 See further E M Wiegand, K R Brown and E M Wilhem, "Socially Principled Investing: Caring about
Ethics and Profitability", Trusts 8: Estates, Aug. 1996. The funds of Catholic archdioceses, foundations
and institutions are also managed according to SRI principles; in the United States, this investment
practice has been formalised in the "NCCB/USCC Socially Responsible Investment Guidelines" (National
Council of Catholic Bishops/United States Catholic Conference, 1991): see further M Naber, "Catholic
Investing: The Effects of Screens on Financial Returns", Journal of Investing, Winter 2001. More
recently, SRI funds managed according to the principles of Islamic law have been marketed to individual
investors in the United States: see further Guide to Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (Dow Jones ft Co,
July 2001); Y T Delorenzo, "Shariah Supervision of Islamic Mutual Funds", Fourth Harvard University
Forum on Islamic Finance, Oct. 2000; RWilson, "Islamic Finance and Ethical Investment" (1997) 24 tnt J
of Social Economics 1325; H Atta, "Ethical Rewards: An Examination of the Effect of Islamic Ethical
Screens on Financial Performance and of Conditioning Information on Performance Measures"
(University of Durham, 2001).
6 See further M S Knoll, "Socially Responsible Investment and Modern Financial Markets" (University of
Pennsylvania, 1999), at 5·6. As regards the impetus for SRI funds provided by the apartheid regime in
South Africa, see P McCarroll, "Socially Responsible Investment of Public Pension Funds: The South
Africa Issue and State law" (1981) 10 NYU Rev of law ft Social Change 407.
7 These funds mark the first time that pooled investments managed according to SRI principles have
been made available to the general community of investors. Previously, SRI strategies were largely the
province of wealthy individuals and charitable foundations.
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First, the increasing popularity of SRI funds in Australia reflects heightened concerns in the
broad community with environmental issues, occupational health and safety, and ethical
standards (as exemplified, for example, by the broad-based support for the Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and public perceptions of
dereliction of duty by corporate officer-bearers in the wake of the collapse of Ansett, HIH
Insurance, OneTel and Pasminco). 8 These concerns have been specifically addressed by the
proponents of SRI strategies; it is claimed that it is no less profitable and prudent to invest
money according to social or ethical criteria than it is to invest for financial gain alone. 9 In
addition, recent moves by several of the large superannuation funds to implement SRI
strategies have encouraged trustees of other superannuation funds and the managers of
managed investment schemes to investigate those strategies. 10
A further impetus for SRI funds comes from the diversification benefits promised by those
funds; that is, SRI funds hold out the prospect of returns that are less strongly correlated to
the performance of conventional equity investments. 11 This is significant, given the
8 Many SRI products are clearly differentiated by their socially-aware credentials. For example, the
FTSE4GOOD Fund managed by Close Fund Managers has an SRI mandate and expects to donate
approximately GBP1 million of investment income annually to UNICEF.
9 These Australian developments are consistent with trends in other OECD countries. In July 2000, the
UK Parliament amended the pension legislation to require the trustees of occupational pension plans to
disclose their policy on the extent to which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken
into account in selecting, retaining and realising investments or exercising the voting or other rights
attached to investments: s 35(3)(f), Pensions Act 1995 (UK); Reg 11A, Occupational Pension Schemes
(Investment) Regulations 1996. The provisions of the Australian Financial Services Reform Act referred
to in n 4 are based on the above UK provisions. Other OECD countries, including Austria, France,
Germany and Switzerland, are considering enacting similar legislation.
10 For example, the Australian Retirement Fund (ARF), Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme and
Public Sector Superannuation Boards (CSS/PSS), Health Employees Superannuation Trust of Australia
(HESTA), Journalist Union Superannuation Trust (JUST), VicSuper and the Victorian Local Authority
Super Scheme (LAS). As regards the adoption of SRI strategies by US pension funds, see further D J
Martin, "The Public Piggy Bank goes to Market: Public Pension Fund Investment in Common Stock and
Fund Trustees' Social Agenda" (1992) 29 San Diego L Rev 39.
11 Thus, the addition of an SRI fund to an investment portfolio should produce diversification benefits
for that portfolio (that is, adding the SRI fund will reduce the risk exposure of the portfolio without
sacrificing performance). The diversification benefits of SRI funds are supported by K A Hickman, W R
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convergence of Australian investment portfolios (with the majority of Australian fund
managers benchmarking their portfolios against the ASX indices published by Standard and
Poor's) and the constraints imposed by risk budgets on active position-taking within
conventional managed investment funds. 12
Many investors, including superannuation trustees, have become dissatisfied with the level of
convergence - also known as "closet indexing" - occurring between actively-managed
portfolios and benchmark indices. This trend has been exacerbated by the increasing focus of
industry "gate keepers" (namely, investment advisers and asset consultants) on relative
performance against indices as opposed to absolute performance. Moreover, in the context
of multi-manager portfolio construction, such convergence is undesirable because it limits the
potential to diversify portfolio risk, and consequently transfers the market (or systemic risk)
from the fund manager back onto the shoulder of the superannuation trustee or other
investment fiduciary.
What is socially responsible investing?
The federal legislature has, as noted previously, tacitly endorsed the use of non-financial
criteria - namely, labour standards and environmental, social and ethical considerations - in
formulating the investment strategy for a managed investment scheme or superannuation
fund. 13 However, an investment strategy will not, merely by reason of the fact that it
incorporates one or more of the above criteria, constitute an SRI strategy.
Teets and J J Kohls, "Social Investing and Modern Portfolio Theory", American Business Review, Jan.
1999.
12 See further P U Ali and M Gold, "An Overview of 'Portable Alpha' Strategies, with Practical Guidance
for Fiduciaries and Some Comments on the Prudent Investor Rule" (2001) 19 C&SLJ 272, at 272-273. See
also P U Ali and M Gold, "Portable Alpha Strategies offer greater scope", JASSA, Summer 2001.
13 Refer n 4.
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A more accurate picture of what constitutes an SRI strategy may be derived by contrasting
conventional or "socially neutral" investment strategies with strategies that are overtly (a)
"socially sensitive" or (b) "socially dictated". 14
Aconventional investment strategy is, in general terms, a strategy that seeks to optimise the
returns of a managed investment scheme or superannuation fund, as measured against the
investment objectives of the fund (for example, outperforming the sap/ASX 200 Index by
3%), for an acceptable level of risk within the financial parameters dictated by the
investment mandate (for example, no more than 5% of the fund assets are to be invested in
the securities of anyone company).15 The key factor for consideration by the investment
fiduciary is therefore an investment's risk/return profile and its likely impact on the fund's
overall risk/return profile. Nonetheless, it is common for fiduciaries in designing or
implementing socially-neutral investment strategies to take into account non-financial or
fundamental factors that may impact upon the risk/return profile of investments (thus, the
fiduciary may decide not to invest in the securities of a company that is in breach of
environmental standards, due to concerns about the impact of the breach on the financial
stability or profitability of the company). However, while non-financial factors may play an
important role in the selection, retention or realisation of investments, that role is secondary
and is subsumed within the overarching (financial) return objectives of the fund.
In contrast, non-financial factors are of primary importance in socially sensitive or socially
dictated investment strategies. A socially sensitive investment strategy is one where the
fiduciary makes its decision as to which investment, in a universe of investments having
comparable risk/return profiles, is to be acquired, retained or realised by reference to non-
financial factors (such as a company's compliance with environmental standards, the
company's employment policies, or whether the company is involved in the manufacture or
sale of alcohol, tobacco or armaments).
14 See further J D Hutchinson and C G Cole, "Legal Standards governing Investment of Pension Assets for
Social and Political Goals" (1980) 128 U Pa L Rev 1340, at 1344-136; P S Cross, "Economically Targeted
Investments - Can Public Pension Plans do Good and do Well?" (1993) 68 Ind LJ 931, at 934-941.
15 See further H E Bines, "Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of
Legal Doctrine" (1976) 76 Colum L Rev 721; J H Langbein and R A Posner, "Social Investing and the Law
of Trusts" (1980) 79 Mich L Rev 72, at 77-83.
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Non-financial factors play a more prominent role in socially dictated investment strategies:
the fiduciary seeks to achieve returns that are acceptable for the level of risk assumed by the
fund whilst, at the same time, undertaking a non-financial objective (for example, allocating
investment funds to companies that have affirmative action hiring policies or are engaged in
environmentally-beneficial activities such waste-recycling).16
On this basis, a general definition of SRI can be proposed. SRI funds and strategies are
characterised by a dual-objective: in deciding whether to acquire, retain or realise an
investment, the fiduciary takes into account both the financial performance (that is, the
risk/return profile) of the investment and the social, ethical or environmental "performance"
or track-record of the underlying company. 17
Legal implications of proper nomenclature
The definition of SRI carries with it significant legal implications: socially responsible
investing is, as the label denotes, ;nvesting. 18 Corporate activism - that is, the purchase of
voting securities in a company for the principal or dominant purpose of advancing a non-
financial agendum at the company's general meetings - is not investing. Ergo, such activities
are not encompassed by SRI. 19 Nor does the diversion of funds to socially meritorious
activities, without reference to the derivation of a return on the funds deployed or the
eventual repayment of those funds, constitute SRI. 20
16 See further E A Zelinsky, "The Dilemma of the Local Social Investment: An Essay on 'Socially
Responsible' Investing" (1984) 6 Cardozo L Rev 111; M Statman, "Socially Responsible Mutual Funds",
Financial Analysts Journal, May/June 2000.
17 All of the Australian SRI funds reviewed offer a "dual" investment objective - that is, they pursue their
SRI objectives while also aiming to exceed a market benchmark such as the sap/ASX200 Index.
18 This is axiomatic. A useful analogy is the objectivist axiom of "A = A", formulated by Ayn Rand.
19 See further Knoll, op cit n 6, at 15. As regards the duty of fund managers and superannuation trustees
to vote securities, see further G P Stapledon, "The Duties of Australian Institutional Investors in
relation to Corporate Governance" (1998) 26 ABLR 331.
20 For example, Bendigo Bank's Ethical Investment account - where part of the interest on the credit
balance of the account is donated to Oxfam Community Aid Abroad - is not an SRI product.
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The legal capacity of a fiduciary to invest the funds entrusted to it does not extend to the
utilisation of those funds for purposes other than investment. 21
Although an investment fiduciary, pursuing a socially sensitive or socially dictated investment
policy, can make investments based on social or ethical criteria, the fiduciary is not
empowered to use the funds held by it for the principal or dominant purpose of advancing
social or ethical goals (as laudable as such an objective might be).22 Dealings by a fiduciary
that fall outside the scope of its legal authority are void ab inWo and, moreover, the
fiduciary will - if the dealing is disavowed by the members of the managed investment
scheme or superannuation fund - be personally liable to compensate the members for any loss
incurred as a result of such transactions/dealings.23
Legal structure of socially responsible investments - using SRI screens to create
investment portfolios
The investment portfolios of SRI funds are commonly constructed using targeted security
screens. 24 These screens filter potential investments in or out of a portfolio based on non-
financial criteria. There are two types of "screens", positive and negative screens, with the
latter being the more prevalent (usually, positive screens are used in conjunction with
negative screens). Positive screens are used to identify desirable investments for inclusion in
a portfolio while negative screens are used to reject investments based on undesirable
21 See further W A Lee, '''-rustee Investing: Homes and Hedges" (2001) 1 QUT Law a Justice J 1.
22 In contrast, to the trustee of a charitable or purpose trust.
23 See further E O'Dell, "Incapacity" in P B H Birks and F Rose (eds), Lessons of the Swaps Litigation
(Mansfield Press, 2000); P U Ali and TRussell, "Investor Remedies against Fiduciaries in Rising and
Falling Markets" (2000) 18 casu 326, at 329-330.
24 Index vendors have also created socially responsible indices using SRI screens: two prominent
examples are the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes and the Financial Times FTSE4GOOD Index:
see further Dow Jones SustainabWty Group Index Guide (Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes GmbH,
Sept. 2000); "Moral Guidance", Global Investor, Sept. 2001.
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characteristics,25 typically those related to the industry in which a company operates or the
company's organisational characteristics.
This screening process is not a new phenomenon. A similar process is used in the creation of
sector or industry-focused managed investment schemes (for example, biotechnology,
internet or telecommunications sector funds). However, SRI screens, unlike the screens
employed in sector-specific funds, are designed to capture selected non-financial attributes
across the entire universe of investable securities without focusing on companies that operate
in a specific sector or industry.
SRI screens can be employed as part of the general investment selection process, although it
is more common for such screens to operate at a discrete level - in the latter instance, an
investable universe of securities is first created by reference to their risk/return profiles and
those securities are then filtered through an SRI screen. A security must therefore pass both
the financial hurdle (that is, possess a desirable risk/return profile) and the SRI screen;
consequently, an investment will be rejected if it fails the SRI screening process, irrespective
of how attractive the investment may be from a risk/return perspective and in terms of the
likely impact of that investment on the overall risk/return profile of the fund. On the other
hand, where the screen forms part of the general investment selection process (in the sense,
that it operates at the same level as the conventional investment selection criteria), it is
possible that an investment with a desirable risk/return profile may be included in the fund's
portfolio despite failing the SRI screening process. This may be effected by downweighting
the investment in the portfolio.
25 For example, the Summit Apex Total Social Impact Fund managed by Summit Mutual Funds invests in
sap 500 index companies that conduct their businesses commendably with respect to the interests of
all stakeholders.
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Figure 1: SRI screening process
Negative screen
Positive screen
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••••••••••••
•••••••••••••••••••••• 1••••••• ••••••••••••• 1
•
Negative screens are typically used to exclude securities issued by companies that operate in
what are considered to be ffsinful" industries (principally, companies in the alcohol,
armaments, gaming, pornography or tobacco sectors).26
More recently, negative screens have been used to filter out the securities of companies
engaged in what are considered to be ffsocially harmful" practices (for example, non-
observance of industrial or labour standards or human rights, or cruelty to animals). There is,
of course, no limit to the non-financial criteria that may be employed to create an SRI
screen; moreover, the investment fiduciary is free to create a screen that gives greater
26 See further M A Cohen, SA Fenn and J S Naimon, f'Environmental and Financial Performance -- Are
they related?" (Vanderbilt University, 1995); R N Kahn, C Lekander and T Leimkuhler, 'fJust say No? The
Investment Implications of Tobacco Divestiture", Journal of Investing, Winter 1997; L Gottsman and J
Kessler, ffSmart Screened Investments: Environmentally Screened Equity Funds perform like
Conventional Funds", Journal of Investing, Fall 1998.
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weight to one criterion than another. The following table provides details of the most
common negative screens employed by SRI funds in the United States.
Table 1: Negative screens used by US SRI funds27
Negative screen - criterion US SRI funds which use a negative screen
incorporating the criterion
Tobacco 96%
Gaming 86%
Alcohol 83%
Armaments 81%
Environmental standards 79%
Human rights 43%
Labour standards 38%
Birth control/abortion 23%
Animal welfare 15%
Use of SRI screens in Australia
We have conducted a survey of thirty-four Australian SRI managed investment schemes and
superannuation funds on offer to retail and institutional investors. The sample of 34 funds
constitutes the entirety of SRI funds available to Australian investors as at the date of the
survey (31 December 2001). The majority of the SRI funds reviewed employ negative screens
while a small number employ both negative and positive screens. 28 The results of this survey
are summarised in the following table.
Table 2: Use of SRI screens by Australian SRI funds29
Negative only screens Positive only screens Negative and Positive
Screens
19 (56%) 3 (9%) 12 (35%)
27 Source: B;ennual Report on Respons;ble InvesUng Trends ;n the US 1999 (Social Investment Forum,
1999).
28 A number of the Australian SRI funds reviewed employ external specialists to undertake the
construction of the screens or investment selection.
29 Source: Stellar Capital (31 Dec. 2001).
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The following tables provide details of the most common negative and positive screens
employed by SRI funds in Australia. 30
Table 3: Negative screens used by Australian SRI funds31
Negative screen - criterion Australian SRI funds which use a negative
screen incorporating the criterion
Armaments 23 (79%)
Uranium mining/Nuclear power 20 (69%)
Gaming 18 (62%)
Tobacco32 18 (62%)
Alcohol33 17 (59%)
Human rights 16 (55%)
Environmental standards 15 (52%)
Labour standards 15 (52%)
Animal welfare 7 (24%)
Pornography 7 (24%)
Table 4: Positive screens used by Australian SRI funds34
Positive screen - criterion Australian SRI funds which use a positive
screen incorporating the criterion
Environmental standards 13 (100%)
Labour standards 9 (69%)
Corporate philanthropy 7 (54%)
Animal welfare 5 (38%)
30 In a minority of cases (2 funds out of 34), sufficient details of the screening criteria were not
available. The two funds in question employed both negative and positive screens; thus, a total of 29
funds were reviewed for Table 3 and a total of 13 funds were reviewed for Table 4.
31 Source: Stellar Capital (31 Dec. 2001).
32 It is likely that this criterion would prevent an SRI fund from investing in securities backed by revenue
from sales of tobacco (for example tobacco litigation bonds where the return on the bonds is dependent
upon the level of tobacco sales). See further P U Ali, "Securitisation and United States Tobacco
Litigation" (2000) 28 ABLR 214.
33 Similarly, this criterion would prevent an SRI fund from investing in asset-backed securities issued
against, for example, champagne inventory. See further "Champagne puts Fizz into French",
International Financial Law Review, Feb. 2000; "Ancien French Security Structure puts the Fizz into the
Champagne Industry", International Financial Law Review, April 2000.
34 Source: Stellar Capital (31 Dec. 2001).
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Screening investments - practical considerations for fiduciaries
Fiduciaries considering investing in SRI funds (or adopting SRI strategies) should be aware of
the practical limitations inherent in the SRI screening process.
First, there may be a mismatch between the investable universe delivered on execution of
the screening process and that which the screen is designed to deliver. This is likely to be
due to the fact that fund managers need to be able to invest in a reasonably broad universe
of securities (there is little commercial sense in creating a fund or investment strategy that
cannot be effectively invested).
Secondly, screening involves arbitrary decisions not only as to the criteria that should be
employed in filtering securities but also to the relative ranking of such criteria. The providers
of SRI screens will, in practice, often have different views as to how a screen should be
created or implemented and this is likely to be reflected in the creation of markedly different
investable universes. 35
Further, some service providers may not exclude "filtered out" companies but may instead,
in creating the investable universe for a SRI fund, downweight the securities of those
companies relative to their market capitalisation. As a result, notwithstanding the promotion
of the fund as an environmentally-aware or ethical fund, that fund's investment portfolio may
include so-called "polluters and shooters" (that is, chemical, mining and petroleum
companies, and armament manufacturers). The perception that the fund has not been
invested "true to label" poses a significant reputational risk to both the manager of the fund
and fiduciaries (such as superannuation trustees) that have invested their beneficiaries'
assets in the fund. Moreover, investors in the fund may consider that they have been misled
by the manager and promoters of the fund.
35 See further D C Tarlas and M J Christ, "Socially Responsible Investing presents Practical Challenges",
Trusts 8: Estates, June 2000; "Warm and Fuzzy. Ethical Investment: The Woolliness of Ethical
Investment", The Economist, 14 July 2001. This "ethical dispersion" may be due to the different data
available to the service providers and the costs associated with maintaining such data or may simply be
attributable to service providers seeking to differentiate themselves from their competitors.
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That discrepancy is also likely to be present where the manager of an SRI fund utilises proxies
to achieve exposure to the market. For example, the investment mandate for one SRI fund
expressly authorises the fund manager to use exchange-traded funds to achieve exposure to
international markets. Exchange-traded funds track broad-based and sector indices without
reference to SRI criteria. 36
Socially responsible investments and the investment duties of fiduciaries - an overview of
the prudent investor rule
Introduction to the prudent investor rule
A trustee or other fiduciary that is empowered to invest the funds entrusted to it by its unit-
holders or other beneficiaries, must exercise that investment power in a prudent manner.
This duty of prudence - the so-called "prudent investor rule" - arises at general law and
supplements the statutory duties of care, skill and diligence imposed by the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) on the single responsible entities of managed investment schemes and the
36 As regards exchange-traded funds, see further P U Ali and M Gold, ''-he Next Generation of Index-
Trackers: Exchange-Traded Funds and the Investment Duties of Fiduciaries" (2000) 18 casu 570; G L
Gastineau, "Exchange-Traded Funds: An Introduction", JournaL of Portfolio Management, Spring 2001;
P U Ali and M Gold, "The New Model Index Fund", JASSA, Spring 2001. On the risks inherent in
abdicating the selection of securities to the compiler of the index, see further R P Austin, "The Role
and Responsibilities of Trustees in Pension Plan Trusts: Some Problems of Trusts Law" in T G Youdan
(ed), Equ;ty, fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1989); J B Shoven and C Sialm, "The Dow Jones Industrial
Average: The Impact of Fixing its Flaws" (Stanford University, 2000); M Gold, "Indexing - the
Fundamental Difference", JASSA, Autumn 2001. A similar issue confronts the managers of SRI funds in
relation to investment products developed using securitisation technology: refer nn 32-33. For instance,
it is unclear whether investing in asset-backed securities issued against a pool of life insurance policies
is permissible under the current screening criteria employed by Australian SRI funds (the cash flow from
the policies - and consequently the risk/return profile of the securities - is dependent upon the actual
mortality rates of the insured persons): see further "Interest in Life Insurance Securitization Heats Up"
(Standard 8: Poor's, 23 Oct. 2001).
15
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) on the trustees of superannuation
funds. 37
The application of the prudent investor rule in Australia has previously been the subject of
detailed consideration. 38 For the purposes of this paper, it sufficies to note that the
Australian courts are likely, in interpreting the prudent investor rule, to adopt the approach
of the United Kingdom and United States courts, and thus require fiduciaries to assess
prospective investments in the context of their impact on the whole of the fiduciary's
investment portfolio.
This "whole-of-portfolio" approach is based upon modern portfolio theory:39
''The central principle of portfolio theory ... is that the risk of a portfolio is wholly
distinct from the risk of any particular investment contained in the portfolio. The risk
37 Corporations Act, s 601 FC(1)(b); Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, s 52(2)(b).
38 R P Meager and W M C Gummow, Jacob's Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed., Butterworths, 1997),
para 1802; F J Finn and P A Ziegler, "Prudence and Fiduciary Obligations in the Investment of Trust
Funds" (1987) 61 ALJ 329; P U Ali, "Riskless Trading: Passport Options, Fund Managers and the Prudent
Investor Rule" (2000) 18 CaSLJ 209; P U Ali and M Gold, "An Overview of 'Portable Alpha' Strategies,
with Practical Guidance for Fiduciaries and Some Comments on the Prudent Investor Rule" (2001) 19
casu 272; P U Ali, "Holistic Risk Management, Nature-Linked Securities and Investors" (2001) 29 ABLR
246; P U Ali and M Gold, "Using the Market to Beat the Market: A Look at 'Geared Beta' Strategies and
Implications for Fiduciaries" (2001) 19 casu 379; P U Ali, "Adding Yield to Stable Portfolios:
Regulating Investments in Australian Hedge Funds" (2001) 19 CaSLJ 414.
39 J N Gordon, "The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Investor Rule" (1987) 62 NYU L Rev
52, at 67. The framing of the prudent investor rule in terms of modern portfolio theory is discussed in
detail in: Bines, op cit n 15, at 763-797; P G Haskell, "The Prudent Investor Rule for Trustee Investment
and Modern Portfolio Theory" (1990) 69 North Carolina L Rev 87, at 100-108; E G Halbach, "Trust
Investment Law in the Third Restatement" (1992) 77 Iowa L Rev 1151, at 1159-1175; R A Levy, "The
Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and Evidence" (1994) 1 George Mason L Rev 1, at 10-18; R J Aalberts
and P SPoon, "The New Prudent Investor Rule and the Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for
Fiduciaries" (1996) 34 ABLJ 39, at 52-60; C L Duronio, "Fiduciary Concerns under the Prudent Investor
Standard", Trusts 8: Estates, Dec. 1996; W B Phillips, "Chasing down the Devil: Standards of Prudent
Investment under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts" (1997) 54 Washington a Law L Rev 335, at 348-
361.
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of a portfolio is a function of the interaction of its component investments. Thus, a
trustee can use securities and instruments that are highly risky viewed in isolation to
assemble a portfolio that is safe... Portfolio theory justifies the inclusion, in
appropriate amounts, of stocks thought to be risky. It also justifies the use of
financial instruments, highly volatile in themselves, that may be deployed so as to
lower portfolio risk or to attain a portfolio of a given risk at a lower cost."
Socially responsible investing and the prudent investor rule
The duty encapsulated in the prudent investor rule is owed by the fiduciary to its unit-holders
or other beneficiaries. The object of that duty is to provide financial benefits to the
beneficiaries through the derivation of an optimum return on the funds entrusted to the
fiduciary - that involves, as noted above, maximising the return on the funds in accordance
with the fund's investment objectives, for an acceptable level of risk. 40 There are two
aspects to this principle.
First, the interests of the unit-holders and other beneficiaries are paramount. As such it is
irrelevant, in addressing the question of the fiduciary's compliance with the prudent investor
rule, to inquire whether the investment of the funds by the fiduciary has benefited employees
(as the objects of labour standards), the wider community (as the objects of environmental
standards and human rights) or, indeed, animals (as the objects of animal welfare).41
Secondly, the primary objective of the trust fund is the generation of an optimal return for
the benefit of the unit-holders and other beneficiaries (that is, the fiduciary must seek to
maximise the return on the fund assets in accordance with the investment objectives of the
fund, for an acceptable level of risk that is within the financial parameters set out in the
fund's investment mandate). This is explicit in the case of managed investment schemes and
40 Cowan v ScargW [1985] Ch 270; Harris v Church Commissioners for England [1992] 1 WLR 1241. See
also A Leigh, "'Caveat Investor': The Ethical Investment of Superannuation in Australia (1997) 25 ABLR
341, at 344-345.
41 Cowan v ScargW [1985] Ch 270. See also A W Scott and W F Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (4th ed.,
Little, Brown tt Co, 1988), para 227.17; R J Lynn, "Investing Pension Funds for Social Goals Requires
Changing the Law" (1981) 53 U Colorado L Rev 101, at 105-106; G McCormack, "Sexy but not Sleazy:
Trustee Investments and Ethical Considerations" (1998) 19 Co Law 39, at 41-43.
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superannuation funds where the beneficiaries have bargained with the fiduciary for economic
exposure to the relevant investment market.
The fiduciary cannot, as a general rule, prioritise non-financial objectives, such as social or
ethical objectives, over the financial objective of optimising the return on the fund assets. 42
However, the pursuit of non-financial objectives is not, of itself, inimical to the financial
objective of optimising the return on the fund assets. 43 It is possible for fund assets to be
legitimately deployed with the aim of improving labour or environmental standards, human
rights or animal welfare provided that, in the pursuit of those goals, the above-stated
financial objective is not disregarded or subordinated to the non-financial goals. 44
On this basis, a fiduciary that sacrifices an adequate rate of return on the fund assets or
places the fund assets in jeopardy, in the pursuit of a non-financial objective, is at risk of
42 See L J Bobo, "Nontraditional Investments of Fiduciaries: Re-Examining the Prudent Investor Rule"
(1984) 33 Emory LJ 1067, at 1087-1089; Nicholls, op cit n 1, at 210-211. Where priority is accorded to
non-financial objectives there is a substantive risk that the deployment of funds by the fiduciary
(however, socially or ethically laudable) will not constitute an investment, placing the fiduciary in the
position of having acted ultra vires. The trust instrument can, of course, authorise the pursuit of non-
financial objectives. However, such a trust would be more properly characterised as a charitable or
purpose trust (depending on the stipulated objectives), as opposed to an investment trust.
43 As noted above, non-financial factors are often taken into account in implementing conventional or
socially neutral investment strategies and, in the case of socially sensitive or socially dictated
investment strategies, non-financial criteria are of equal importance to financial criteria in the
investment decision-making process. cf G Djurasovic, "The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual
Funds" (1997) 22 J Corp Law 257 where it is argued that the nature of the investment fiduciary's duties
should reflect the expectations of investors in the fund. Hence, the trustee of an SRI fund cannot
pursue financial goals at the expense of the social or political goals of the fund. This, of course, raises
the question of whether a trustee that prioritises social or political goals over financial goals has
properly discharged its duties.
44 Interestingly, some well-credentialled screened index providers do not take account of the financial
performance of firms in compiling SRI indices. For example, the Dow Jones Global Sustainability Index
ignores the financial performance of index companies beyond a consideration of how a company has
adapted to the changes in its economic environment: Dow Jones SustainabWty Group Index Guide, op
cit n 23, p 9. In the context of the prudent investor rule, these approaches are establishing a precedent
of challengeable legality.
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being in breach of the prudent investor rule. 45 This leads directly to the hypothesis that·is
tested in the second part of this paper: can a fiduciary implement an SRI investment strategy
or invest in an SRI fund without sacrificing an adequate rate of return on the fund assets, that
is, is there a financial cost involved in implementing an SRI investment strategy or investing in
an SRI fund?
C. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS
Introduction
Although it is possible to posit a general legal definition of SRI, there are significant variations
between the screening techniques commonly used by the providers of SRI screens and the
managers of SRI funds. This inherent level of definitional subjectivity - and the consequent
lack of comparable data - means that it is not possible to determine the characteristics of
Australian SRI strategies and funds as an investment asset class objectively, with obvious
difficulties for the assessment of whether or not SRI strategies represent a more optimal
risk/return trade-off for investors, in terms of modern portfolio theory. 46
. 45 See R B Ravikoff and M P Curzan, "Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man
Rule" (1980) 68 Calif L Rev 518, at 520-528. In addition, the investable universe for an SRI strategy is,
by definition, narrower than the relevant market. This diversification cost may lead to an increase in
the market or systemic risk of the SRI portfolio. The sacrifice of portfolio diversification by the
fiduciary may, depending upon the increased market risk of the SRI portfolio compared to a diversified
portfolio for which investments can be selected from the entire market, constitute a breach of the
prudent investor rule. See further Langbein and Posner, op cit n 15, at 85-92; Knoll, op cit n 6, at 20-
31.
46 The relative immaturity of this market category in Australia, in terms of asset scale and the
population of comparable funds with extended performance records, is illustrated by a brief report
released by AMP Henderson Global Investors ("The Investment Implications of Choosing an SRI Fund",
Feb. 2002). The AMP report examines the returns of nine Australian SRI share funds selected from the
wider population of SRI funds available to Australian investors. The report compared the median (not a
fund-weighted average) return of the nine funds with the performance of sap/ASX 200 Index and
observed that for the subset of the nine funds in operation for 3 years or more, the median return
exceeded the returns for the broad market before fees.
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Overseas studies of SRI strategies
A number of empirical studies conducted overseas have considered the optimality of SRI
strategies (that is the ability of such strategies to deliver maximum returns for their level of
risk).47 Generally, these studies can be categorised into two groups. The first group, which
includes studies by D'Antonio, Johnsen and Hutton (1997) and Abramson and Chung (2000),
has focused on the performance of a hypothetical SRI portfolio. 48 The second group, which
includes studies by Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) and Reyes and Grieb (1998), has,
instead, examined the returns generated by individual SRI funds. 49
D'Antonio, Johnsen and Hutton (1997) constructed a hypothetical portfolio of SRI debt
securities (the portfolio comprised debt securities issued by companies with shares
represented in the Domini 400 Social Index) and compared the performance of the portfolio
over the period from May 1990 to March 1996 with the performance of the leading United
States corporate bond index, the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Index. Abramson and
Chung (2000) also tested a hypothetical SRI portfolio. However, in that case, the portfolio
comprised SRI "value" shares (shares with relatively high yields or lower than average market
capitalisation-to-revenue ratios were selected from the shares represented in the Domini 400
Social Index). Abramson and Chung compared the performance of their portfolio over the
period from July 1990 to March 2000 with the performance of the leading United States value
indices (that is, the Russell 1000 Value, sap Barra Value and Wilshire Large Cap Value
indices).
Neither study disclosed material differences between the performance, during the relevant
analysis period, of the hypothetical SRI portfolio and that of the non-SRI benchmark index.
47 For example, S Hamilton, H Jo and M Statman, "Doing Well while Doing Good? The Investment
Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds", Financ;al Analysts Journal, NovIDee. 1993; L
D'Antonio, T Johnsen and R B Hutton, "Expanding Socially Screened Portfolios: An Attribution Analysis
of Bond Performance", Journal of Investing, Winter 1997; M G Reyes and T Grieb, "The External
Performance of Socially-Responsible Mutual Funds", American Business Review, Jan. 1998; L Abramson
and D Chung, "Socially Responsible Investing: Viable for Value Investors", Journal of Investing, Fall
2000.
48 D'Antonio, Johnsen and Hutton, ibid; Abramson and Chung, ibid.
49 Hamilton, Jo and Statman, op cit n 47; Reyes and Grieb, op cit n 47.
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As noted above, the second group of studies has examined the comparative performance of
individual SRI funds. Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) calculated the excess returns or
"alpha" of 17 individual SRI funds over the period from January 1981 to December 1990. 50
This stUdy did not find any statistically significant variations in the performance of the
individual funds. 51 Reyes and Grieb (1998) undertook an examination of the monthly prices
and rates of return for 15 individual SRI funds over the period from January 1986 to December
1995. However, because of the substantial differences between the SRI funds (in terms of
screens used and investment objectives), the performance of the SRI funds was evaluated
against conventional or "non-SRI" funds with identical investment styles (that is, "aggressive
growth", "balanced", "growth" and t'growth and income").52 Again, this study did not find
material variations between the performance of individual SRI funds and the performance of
conventional funds employing the same investment style.
Thus, all of the studies referred to above indicate that SRI strategies can be implemented
without incurring a material financial cost.
The approaches adopted in the above articles are not, however, readily adaptable to the
Australian context for a number of reasons: namely, the relatively small number of
Australian SRI funds (34), the subjective nature of the screens used by the funds and the
50 Jensen's alpha was used to measure excess returns: see further M Jensen, "The Performance of
Mutual Funds in the period 1945-1964" (1968) 23 J of Finance 389.
51 The SRI funds examined by Hamilton, Jo and Statman all employed both negative and positive
screens. The negative screens used by these funds were substantially similar. There were, however,
significant variations between the positive screens. See further Hamilton, Jo and Statman, op cit n 47,
at 63-64. The difficulties of comparing SRI funds with substantially different screens is acknowledged by
Statman: M Statman, "Socially Responsible Mutual Funds", Financial Analysts Journal, May/June 2000.
Hamilton, Jo and Statman also compared the average performance of the 17 funds with the average
performance of conventional (ie non-SRI) funds. Again, this comparison did not disclose any material
differences in performance: Hamilton, Jo and Statman, ibid, at 64-66.
52 Reyes and Grieb, op cit n 47, at 2. For a comprehensive account of investment styles, see "Equity
Style Investing and the Salomon Smith Barney World Equity Style Indices" (Salomon Smith Barney, Jan.
2000).
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substantive differences between those screens,53 and the general lack of comparable data.
This not only renders it difficult to construct a meaningful common benchmark for Australian
SRI funds (such as an SRI index analogous to the Domini 400 Social Index) but it also means
that any comparison of the returns of individual Australian SRI funds will be of questionable
quality. 54
Methodology of this paper
This paper considers the optimality of SRI strategies in the Australian market. The key claim
that is made by the proponents of SRI strategies - and one that is consistent with the overseas
studies mentioned above - is that it is no less profitable or prudent to implement an SRI
strategy or invest in an SRI fund than it is to invest in a socially neutral fund.
The majority of Australian SRI funds employ negative screens and the majority of those funds
exclude the securities of companies in the armaments, uranium mining/nuclear power,
gaming, tobacco and alcohol sectors.
This provides a strong foundation for empirical assessment by mutual exclusion. It is
therefore possible to conduct a meaningful appraisal of a paradigmatic SRI strategy by
measuring the performance contribution of "sinful" industries (viz, alcohol and gaming) to
the broader stockmarket and thus the "market portfolio". The "mutual exclusion"
methodology employed in this paper differentiates this paper from previous empirical studies
of SRI strategies undertaken in the United States and elsewhere. 55
53 Refer n 50 and, in particular, Statman, op cit n 51.
54 Likewise, it is difficult to conduct a meaningful comparison of Australian SRI and non-SRI funds. In
addition, the small number and disparate nature of Australian SRI funds renders it difficult to
categorise Australian SRI funds into investment styles (per the analysis of SRI funds undertaken by Reyes
and Grieb, op cit n 47): refer n 51.
55 L Kurtz, "No Effect, or No Net Effect? Studies on Socially Responsible Investing", Journal of Investing,
Winter 1997 summarises the leading United States studies of SRI strategies. For a recent overview of SRI
strategies in the United Kingdom, see S Williams, "UK Ethical Investment comes of Age", Journal of
Investing, Summer 1999.
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Accordingly, where the sinful industries do not reflect a positive contribution to the market,
in absolute or risk-adjusted terms, then it would be reasonable to conclude that their
omission from an SRI portfolio would not entail a financial sacrifice (in the form of a lower
rate of return) or reduce the efficiency of the portfolio or vice versa. If, however, the
exclusion of sinful industries entails a financial cost to the investor or the fiduciary has not
considered the characteristics of the SRI strategy, there is a real risk that a fiduciary which
allocated the funds of its unit-holders or other beneficiaries to the SRI strategy may be taken
to be in breach of the prudent investor rule.
Australian "sinful" industry proxies
In the Australian context, the most suitable data available relates to the Australian Stock
Exchange's Alcohol and Tobacco, and Tourism and Leisure, sub-indices. 56 These proxies are
used to assess the contribution of Australian "alcohol" and "gaming" companies to investment
portfolios.
The ASX Alcohol and Tobacco r'ALTO") Index comprises wine makers and brewing companies;
it no longer includes tobacco companies, with the last tobacco constituent being removed
from the ALTO Index on 9 May 2001.
The ASX Tourism and Leisure ("TOUR") Index data commences in December 1994 and, despite
its benign name, includes Australia's largest casinos and wagering organisations and gaming
machine manufacturers. This proxy also includes companies that are engaged in hotel
management and entertainment; however, in terms of market capitalisation, the impact of
the securities of those companies on the TOUR Index is not significant (these companies
account for approximately 13% of the TOUR Index).57
56 Gaming" and "Alcohol" are, respectively, the third and fifth most popular negative screens used by
Australian SRI funds: refer to Table 3. As regards publicly-traded Australian shares, there are no
equivalent market proxies for screens such as "armaments", "uranium mining/nuclear power", "human
rights" and "environmental standards".
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The following tables provide details of the ALTO and TOUR Index constituents.
Table 5: ALTO Index constituents58
ASX Alcohol and Tobacco Market value ($ million) % of index
Index
Brian McGuigan Wines 186 0.9%
BRL Hardy 1,907 9.3%
Cranswick Premium Wines 55 0.3%
Evans a Tate 72 0.4%
Fosters Group 9,903 48.3%
Lion Nathan 2,461 12%
Peter Lehmann Wines 134 0.7%
Simeon Wines 199 1.0%
Southcorp 5,569 27.2%
20,486 100.0%
Table 6: TOUR Index constituents59
ASX Tourism and Leisure Market value ($ million) %of index
Index
Amalgamated Holdings 311 2.7%
Aristocrat Leisure 2,978 25.8%
Breakwater Island 43 0.4%
Burswood 314 2.7%
Casino Austria Intl 105 0.9%
Earth Sanctuaries 11 0.1%
Fleetwood Corporation 58 0.5%
Hamilton Island 92 0.8%
Jupiters 1,207 10.5%
Reef Casino Trust 13 0.1%
Sea World Trust 189 1.6%
Sydney Aquarium 73 0.6%
TAB 1,360 11.8%
TAB Queensland 386 3.3%
Tabcorp Holdings 3,673 31.8%
57 The TOUR Index is thus not a perfect proxy for the gaming sector. However, the performance of the
TOUR Index is driven substantially by gaming companies (which have an aggregate index weighting of
approximately 87% versus 13% for non-gaming companies).
58 Source: Datastream (31 Dec. 2001).
59 Ibid.
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Village Roadshow 446 3.9%
Village Roadshow "A" Pref. 279 2.4%
11,538 100.0%
Financial performance of sinful industries
We have calculated the total return (capital appreciation and income receipts) from the
sinful industries (with the ALTO and TOUR indices as proxies for such industries) and the
broad market (represented by the ASX All Ordinaries Index) since the commencement of the
TOUR index in December 1994 (our base date) for the seven year period ending 31 December
2001. We have also decomposed the total return contributions from the ALTO and TOUR
indices to generate an rrAll Ordinaries ex-Sinful Industries" rrAORDXSIN") Index. The figures
below show the performance of the sinful industries proxies vis-a.-vis the broad market over
this period.
25
Figure 2: Total returns from "sinful" industries versus broad market60
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60 Sources: Datastream; Burdett Buckeridge Young (31 Dec. 2001). The returns have been re-indexed to
a common base for comparative purposes.
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Figure 3: Scatter plots for "sinful" industries versus the broad market61
61 Sources: Datastream; Burdett Buckeridge Young (31 Dec. 2001).
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Our performance analysis of the two sinful industries (alcohol and gaming) indicates that the
alcohol companies - but not gaming companies - contributed positively to the market
portfolio over the analysis period. Exclusion of the securities of alcohol companies from the
market portfolio therefore means investors would have forgone returns over the analysis
period.
The ALTO Index made a strong and consistent performance contribution, outperforming the
broad market by 9.8% per annum (that is, 22.5% for the ALTO Index versus 12.7% for the
broad market). Over the analysis period, a $1 m portfolio invested in the ALTO Index would
have returned approximately $4.1 m, compared with $2.3m (a shortfall of $1.8m for market
investors) if the portfolio had been indexed to the broad market over this period instead.
The performance of gaming companies as represented by the TOUR Index was more variable.
Over the analysis period, the TOUR Index underperformed the broad market by 3.1% per
annum (that is, 9.6% for the TOUR Index versus 12.7% for the broad market), and variability
of the TOUR Index returns was higher. Over the analysis period, a $1 m portfolio invested in
the TOUR Index would have returned approximately $1.9m compared with $2.3m (a shortfall
of $OAm for TOUR investors) if the portfolio had been indexed to the broad market over this
period instead.
The following table summaries the relative financial performance of the sinful industries over
the analysis period.
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Table 7: Performance characteristics of Australia's sinful industries
ALTO TOUR All Ords AORDXSIN
Market $20.5 $11.5 $720.5 $688.3
capitalisation
($billion)
Return (per 22.5% 9.6% 12.7% 12.0%
annum)
Risk (per 14.4% 17.7% 12.4% 12.0%
annum)
Sharpe ratio62 1.14 0.20 0.53 0.49
Reward ratio63 1.57 0.54 1.02 1.00
To determine the efficiency of the returns from sinful industries we have analysed
performance according to a risk-adjusted framework. The "reward ratio" shows the
contribution of returns per unit of risk taken. Clearly, the ALTO sector was an efficient
contributor to market returns, while the TOUR sector was inefficient (the reward ratio was
significantly below that of the overall market).
We have also conducted a regression analysis of ALTO and TOUR Index returns against the
broad market to calculate the beta (or sensitivity) of returns for the sinful industries. The
betas calculated demonstrated a very strong correlation (95%) between the returns of TOUR
Index and the broad market. The ALTO Index, however, had strong absolute returns with low
62 The Sharpe ratio has been calculated as follows:
where:
• (r;) is the investment return;
• (r, ) is the rate of return from a risk free asset;
• (R;) is the risk of the investment denoted by the standard deviation of its returns.
We have used the UBS Warburg Australia Bank Bill Index as the proxy for risk-free returns available to
most local investors.
63 The reward ratio is the quotient of return over risk, and thus represents the contribution to a
portfolio of returns per unit of risk taken.
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market sensitivity (51%). This indicates a highly beneficial contribution to the market
portfolio, with strong outperformance at the expense of a slight increase in risk coupled with
low correlation to the broad market.
The contribution to market performance is a function of returns and market capitalisation.
As shown in Table 7, the ALTO and TOUR sectors represented approximately 3.2% and 1.7%
respectively of the total market benchmark as at 30 November 2001.
On average, over the seven year analysis period, the exclusion of the sinful industries from
the market portfolio resulted in a performance shortfall of 0.70% per annum, reducing the
broad market return from 12.7% to 12.0% per annum. While the exclusion of sinful industries
did reduce the volatility or risk of the market portfolio (from 12.4% per annum to 12.0% per
annum), the reward ratio also fell, reflecting a sub-optimal risk/return trade-off.
Real world costs and opportunities
The above empirical analysis of the performance of companies in the alcohol and gaming
sectors suggests that there can be a financial sacrifice involved in excluding sinful industries
from an investment portfolio. However, due to the nature of the screening techniques
employed, SRI strategies may be highly correlated to the broad market; most SRI funds will be
able to generate returns from the largest market sectors, namely banks, telecommunications
and media, as is the case with conventional managed funds. Investment fiduciaries should
therefore be aware of the costs of a pure SRI strategy but also the potential of the SRI funds
promoted in Australia to track or outperform the broad market.
In addition, investors need to be aware of the higher management expense ratios associated
with the SRI funds on offer in Australia. Our review of Australian SRI managed investment
schemes and superannuation funds reveals that investors in Australian SRI funds generally
face additional fee imposts, compared to investors in mainstream Australian managed
investment schemes or superannuation funds. 64 This is largely attributable to fund managers
64 In a climate of lower absolute market returns, this can have a large impact on the net return to the
investor. See further Langbein and Posner, op cit n 15, at 93-4.
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passing on to investors the development and marketing costs for SRI funds and the fees paid
to external service providers (primarily, index vendors and SRI research providers). 65
D. CONCLUSION
The empirical analysis of SRI strategies, in the Australian market, suggests that there are
implicit costs in avoiding so-called "sinful" industries (as exemplified by companies in the
alcohol sector). Over the analysis period - from December 1994 to December 2001 - the ALTO
index (as the proxy for alcohol companies66) strongly outperformed the broad market, with its
constituent companies proving to be efficient sources of diversification and portfolio return.
Moreover, investors that avoided the companies in the ALTO index but otherwise invested
according to the broad market index would have underperformed relative to the broad
market. Gaming securities, in contrast, would have been a relatively poor portfolio bet for
investors.67
Excluding the securities of alcohol companies from the portfolio of an SRI fund would, over
the analysis period, have entailed a significant financial cost to investors in the SRI fund. This
raises doubts as to the prudence of fiduciaries that allocate the funds of their unit-holders or
other beneficiaries to an SRI strategy or fund which uses a negative screen to reject the
securities of alcohol companies (which is the case with 59% of Australian SRI funds that
employ a negative screen). In contrast, the decision of a fiduciary to allocate funds to an SRI
fund that rejects gaming securities (which is the case with 62% of Australian SRI funds that
employ a negative screen) is considerably more defensible legally, given the relatively poor
performance of gaming securities, as illustrated by the performance of the TOUR Index over
the analysis period.
65 However, direct investors that operate relatively simple internal screens are unlikely to incur
significant additional costs.
66 As noted above, tobacco companies are no longer represented in the ALTO Index.
67 The authors' findings with regard to the poor performance of gaming shares relative to other sinful
industries are consistent with a previous United States study of the gaming industry: see further CLuck,
"'Sinful' Industry Returns in the United States", BARRA Newsletter, MarchiApril 1992.
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This does not, however, mean that the mere allocation by an investment fiduciary of funds to
an SRI strategy or SRI fund that excludes, for example, alcohol securities, is, of itself,
inconsistent with the prudent investor rule. It is unlikely that an Australian court would
consider such a fiduciary to be in breach of its duty of prudence where the decision to invest
has been made after due consideration of the performance characteristics of the relevant
securities, and the impact of their exclusion on the risk/return profile of the fiduciary's
portfolio and, consequently, the fiduciary's ability to generate an optimum return for its unit-
holders or other beneficiaries. Moreover, given the nature of the screening techniques
employed by Australian SRI funds, returns from those funds may be correlated to the broad
market.
SRI proponents may point to market outperformance by SRI funds as validating the proposition
that SRI strategies do not entail any significant financial sacrifice and may in fact provide
superior returns. The efficacy of these claims is undermined by the relative immaturity of
the Australian SRI market in terms of the scale of assets under management and the absence
of a comparable population of funds with extended performance track-records. The potential
for an SRI fund to beat the market (as measured by an index) may exist where the fund does
not employ an index-weighted approach to stock selection. Such outperformance, however,
is dependent upon portfolio selection, the broad market return and the period used for
analysis. Accordingly, the phenomenon of (short-term) outperformance does not necessarily
affirm the superiority of SRI strategies as the potential to beat the market is a characteristic
of all non-indexed portfolios.
